Since its economic and symbolic opening in the late 70s, China's rise to power has been nothing short of remarkable. It had managed to pull nearly its whole population out of poverty and created massive economic hubs in the region that will undoubtedly become only more important in the next decades. However, it is not all a dance on roses, as the rise of China is seen as a threat in many parts of the world, however, most of all by the United States and its allies in Asia and Europe. But is China the large threat that it is often regarded as in the West? It is a difficult question to answer, however, by using two theories from international relations this article will argue that China’s rise is not necessarily a threat to the world.
Discussion in the field of international relations
Much of the discussion about China’s rise in the field of international relations has been divided between the optimistic liberalists and the pessimistic realists. Liberalists argue that the current international order of economic globalization and political openness can accommodate China’s rise. Global powers such as the United States, according to the theory, will accept and welcome China’s entrance into the existing order, and China will join this order rather than trying to overturn and change the current order through hard power.
The liberalists also argue that China is already so interlinked with the current international order that it makes it nearly impossible to get out of the system without devastating consequences. As China is often dubbed the “factory of the world”, its economy has become so dependent upon exports, especially towards the Western industrialized world, and making enemies with your investors is generally not a smart move. Furthermore, they argue that China has become so rich as a result of this system, it is a head-scratcher to argue they would ever want to change the system when it benefits them so much.
A powerful China doesn’t have to trigger a possible cold war when a US-China power transition theoretically happens in the future as we see an international order that is fundamentally different from those past rising states confronted. The Western-led international order is open, integrated and rule-based, and nuclear weapons have made armed conflict between great powers to overturn global systems less likely. In short, today’s system is hard to reverse and easy to join. Furthermore, the order facilitates the integration of established great powers and newly independent states, democracies and dictatorships alike. So the non-discriminatory aspect of the order makes it easy for a country like China to exist and thrive.
Optimistic Realism
The standard realist viewpoint, on the other hand, predicts extraordinary competition. In basic realist terms, when China becomes more powerful, it will assert itself in the international arena more firmly, and in turn, the United States and powerful Western states will try to balance against it. This balance of power will resemble the Cold War standoff between the US and the Soviet Union, a very unpredictable time in international relations history. United States’ closer relationship with regional power India, and its efforts refocused on Asia is proof that this assertiveness and balancing is already happening.
However, realism provides a more nuanced and optimistic picture if we analyse it differently. The outcome of China’s rise will depend less on pressures generated by the international community than on how the US and China manage the smaller disputes in Northeast Asia. Current international conditions should enable both the US and China to protect their vital interests without posing a serious threat to each other. Of course, as earlier mentioned, nuclear weapons play a part in this. But in no foreseeable increase in China’s power will be enough to launch a successful attack on the US, and vice versa, so a full-on military clash is not likely. Both states will in that case maintain a large amount of security and the security dilemma is unlikely to worsen. If the United States remains restrained in responding to China’s modernization and expansion of its nuclear weapons, then it will show China that the US is not threatened by China increasing its security, and we avoid another nuclear arms race, and an insecurity or cold war problem.
In any case, historically, a bipolar world where two great powers exist to balance each other out is a safer and more predictable system than a multipolar and unipolar world. In a multipolar world, we saw the arms race, political insecurity, and the European powers’ megalomania that eventually led to World War 1 and 2. While in a unipolar world we’ve seen the missteps of the United States in its post 9/11 war on terror and invasions in the Middle East. We see generally more stability in a world where two global powers balance each other out, even if they’re not enthusiastic about cooperating like during the Cold War. The difference this time around is that China is already a part of the international system that the US created, and do not seem interested in changing it. Cooperation between the two great powers should theoretically be significantly easier than during the Cold War.
The disputes in East Asia, like the question of Taiwan and the independence of Hong Kong, are important. However, these disputes are also not existential threats to the international system and should not be perceived as such. If the United States and China can show restraint, these are not conflict that will lead to a new cold war. While the interests of these great powers do not usually overlap, they can learn to live with each other’s existence.
Bibliography
Ikenberry, G. J. (2008). The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs, 87(1), 23–37. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20020265
Glaser, C. (2011). Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism. Foreign Affairs, 90(2), 80–91. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25800459
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