The Gulf of Guinea, in geopolitical terms, roughly corresponds to the membership of the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA), an organization of 25 West African countries stretching from Angola in the south, to Mauritania in the north. The economies of these states rely heavily on maritime transport and transit, and the region is rich in natural resources like iron and gold, as well as fossil fuels, mostly being transported to European and North American markets. Nevertheless, there is an increasing number of threats to the economic promise and stability of the Gulf of Guinea, namely piracy attacks, hijackings, armed robbery at sea, drug trafficking, illegal fishing, illegal migration, and terrorism. The rise of piracy and crime originates in the affected states not being able to exercise sovereignty and control in their territories including the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This stems from the corruption of political officials by crime syndicates, rather than a failed state, as in the case of Somalia, which will be discussed further in the article.
The Gulf of Guinea and the Growth of Piracy
The Gulf of Guinea is one of the most dangerous maritime zones in the world. Up until 2012 pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia still exceeded those of West Africa in frequency, maritime insecurity, the cost to international shipping and range, however after this point the Gulf of Guinea surpassed the Gulf of Aden (where the Somali pirates are active) as the region with the highest reported amount of pirate attacks. The international community have become increasingly aware of the global consequences of this maritime threat on the global economy and development in the regional states. The regional states in the Gulf of Guinea vary markedly in size, population, economy, political and institutional stability. Countries like Ghana, Cameroon and Nigeria’s economies dwarf those of Togo, Benin, Sao Tome and Principe, however to an extent all the countries struggle to assert their authority, especially in the maritime waters.
The massive coastline of the Gulf of Guinea offers idyllic conditions for shipping. An enormous number of harbours is in the region and lacks any serious chokepoints and bad weather, and the region is rich in resources. In short, there is immense potential for maritime commerce, resource extraction, shipping, and development. The Gulf has become a hub for transiting a significant amount of the petroleum products consumed in Europe, North America and Asia, accounting for a large amount of the regional economy. However, because of this regional economic boom, piracy attacks have become increasingly regular. There has been a limited maritime security presence in the region, and drug traffickers in South American found the region as an attractive transit route to Europe. Furthermore, oil theft has become a regular occurrence, and countries like Nigeria lose up to 100,000 barrels a day due to theft. West Africa’s waters also contain the highest levels of illegal fishing in the world.
As of 2015, the Gulf of Guinea stands as the most dangerous maritime territory in the world in terms of the success rate of attacks and violence. United Nations Security Council adopted resolutions 2018 and 2039 expressing concern about the increasing insecurity in the Gulf that will have consequences for regional and global security. The developments in the Gulf increased, with 2013 there being more attacks than any previous years. Since 2005 the region has seen a significant rise in piracy incidents, with yearly incidents more than doubling in a few years. Furthermore, the statistics only show part of the problem, as it is believed that only about half of the piracy incidents in the Gulf is reported as ship captains fear reprisal attacks. It has come to the point where the Gulf of Guinea has surpassed and replaced Somalia as the new piracy hotspot of the world.
Piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea composed 1/5 of all recorded maritime attacks in 2013, and as stated, that is only a part of the real number. Incidents in the Gulf indicate that pirates have a preference for crude oil and oil products. Attacks on shipping in the Gulf of Guinea has exposed vulnerabilities in the regional maritime territory (Osinowo, 2015, p. 2). However, piracy has not affected the whole region equally. There are certain hot spots in the area where we see a higher risk of piracy. The coasts of Nigeria, Benin and Togo are together the epicentre of piracy in the Gulf and are collectively the most dangerous maritime areas in the region. To put it in perspective, Nigeria alone accounts for reported piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
International Economic Interests in the Gulf of Guinea
There has become significant international interest in the Gulf of Guinea since the discovery of large amounts of oil and gas along the coast and offshore. International presence up until recently were mainly from France, through its ties with former colonies, and some European companies with interests in the Nigerian oil sector. However, US energy policy takes the Gulf into account and other powers such as China, India and South Africa have shown interest in the region as well. The Gulf of Guinea is the leading sub-Saharan main oil-producing territory, producing around 5 million barrels every day. Investments by Western energy companies have been rising since the early 2000s. The US increased their investments in the region between 2002 and 2008. In the same timespan, China has also begun investing in several regional states, as well as Brazil.
After fossil fuels, fishing is the second most important resource in the Gulf of Guinea. Historically, the African migrants to the area were drawn by fishing and mixed in with the local population who were mainly farmers and created a mixed economy of farming and fishing. However, today the local fishers compete with foreign industrial fishing. Fishing is the second-highest export for many Gulf states; however, this sector is highly affected by maritime insecurity. An increase in attacks on fishing trawlers has led to less fishing activity in the region. The sector is also neglected by most states governments, as they are more interested in fossil fuel income.
Why is the region struggling with piracy?
Maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea can be explained by structural problems like poverty, socio-political tension, and the resentments of the local population towards the government and foreign influence. The frustration in the populations can be seen through the radicalization and willingness of turning to crime. Other factors are dense populations, weak borders, disagreements between states and a weak central government when it comes to upholding the law. But at the centre of the problem is socioeconomics and governance, with a large percentage of the population living in poverty and a small wealthy elite. There’s close to no transparency about where the profits of the fossil fuel industry go to, which is monopolized by the elite and foreign companies. The extremely unbalanced distribution of wealth leads to resentment and even outrage in the populations at large.
Furthermore, the extraction of oil and gas out of the region threatens the coastal environment and ecosystems, hindering agriculture, fishing, and cattle. This threatens the livelihood of local populations and tempts them toward illegal activities like piracy. What started as illegal trade of various goods like oil and drugs, eventually became sophisticated networks of crime when the region became an economic hotspot. The results have been arms-dealing, attacking of oil ships and piracy.
The Gulf region has dense cities and metropolises all along the coast, which has helped create excellent conditions for crime and coastal piracy. The urban disorder has developed from the mass migration towards these cities from the interior of the states, creating further economic disparities and political conflicts. We see economic tensions in countries like Nigeria where the ruling elite have access to most of the resources, and there’s also cultural tension between the indigenous coastal people and immigrant settlers. Lastly, border disputes between the Gulf of Guinea countries since the discovery of oil leads states to lack authority to enforce laws in many areas and hamper any security cooperation between the states when it comes to fighting piracy.
Nigeria, the Niger Delta Insurgency and Piracy
Nigeria contains half the population of the region and accounts for half of the regional GDP. Oil is the main income of Nigeria’s export income and is by far the most important industry in the entire region. However, for a long time, it has been threatened by transnational organized crime and more recently regional crime of piracy. Despite having substantial income from oil, Nigeria continues to be one of the poorest countries in the world. The oil sector is subjected to continuous criminal predation is a considerable reason why the revenues aren’t as high as they could be. The diversion of oil resources in Nigeria used to be tied heavily to the conflict in the Niger Delta. Militias emerged and led a campaign of theft and sabotage of the oil industry to undermine it. It was quite successful by managing to cut the production output by 1/3 and making the oil thieves $1 billion every year.
However, the government gave amnesty to the Delta militants, and most of the leadership seized the opportunity. The Niger Delta conflict effectively came to an end in 2011 and with it the link between political activism and oil theft. Oil theft has become a regional problem, most likely because of the end of the national conflict and politicization of the oil. The demobilization of the insurgents led to a decrease in pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea for a while, however, 2011 saw a sharp increase in piracy-related attacks, and most of the piracy can be traced back to the Niger Delta. It is a high likelihood that the Niger Delta harbours pirates that threatens the maritime security in the region. Parts of the Niger Delta insurgency have gone from attacking oil platforms, kidnapping offshore workers, or extorting oil companies, to full-time piracy careers. The unique thing about the Gulf of Guinea pirates is that rather than existing in a symbiotic relationship with insurgents, the insurgents themselves became pirates.
The Niger Delta insurgency evolved from a local threat to Nigerian resources into a region-wide maritime security threat in approximately ten years. It started as opportunistic sea robbery as an additional income and gradually evolved and the attacks became more surgical, planned and the scope expanded and became more violent. In a post-amnesty Nigeria, the insurgency evolved into full-scale piracy, and attacks became more prevalent from 2010 on. By mid-2011 the threat of regional piracy had become clear, evident from multiple attacks on the coast of Benin, which meant the Niger Delta pirates had expanded their enclave.
Counter-Piracy Measures
Attacks on shipping in the Gulf have exposed vulnerabilities in the region’s maritime area. However, countermeasures by Nigeria led to an increase of attacks in Benin, leading to a joint operation between Benin and Nigeria to suppress the activity. The United States, United Kingdom, European Union, African Union, and United Nations are all involved to various degrees when it comes to countering increased piracy in the region. However, the extremely adaptive character of the Gulf of Guinea pirates mimics what we’ve seen with the Somali pirates. As in the antipiracy gains in the Gulf of Aden mutated into nearby maritime territories in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Single-state solutions work for a while, it cannot contain the regional flexibility of the pirates. To fight such a threat the Gulf of Guinea needs a cross-border, water and land and international strategy.
Effective counterpiracy measures must consider the particular way the pirates in the Gulf of Guinea operate. In Somalia multilateral counter-piracy measures were successful and led to the steady decline in piracy, however, the opposite can be said about the Gulf of Guinea measures, where we see an escalation and spreading of maritime criminal activity all over the region. It suggests that the regional pirates master geography and the shipping ports, and there’s no area too dangerous for the pirates. It seems that we see a development of consolidation and expansion in the pirate enclaves. While the Niger Delta pirates continue to consolidate their power and activity in Nigeria, Benin, and Togo, they also venture into new areas. Oil tankers on the maritime coasts of Ghana and Angola started getting hijacked and stolen from in 2014, shattering the maritime safety reputation of the two states. It also proved that oil tankers will continue being the main targets of pirates because the financial reward for stolen oil is extremely high.
Why is piracy thriving in the region?
There are many reasons why pirates in the Gulf of Guinea continue to thrive and expand. There are minimal coastguard services, minimal civilian as well as military patrolling in the region. Furthermore, they often lack training or equipment for boarding operations, or they’re bribed by the pirates. A lot of the time boats and ships are left to their own devices and are having to find alternative protection methods. Low levels of economic development and high unemployment rate, particularly among the youth of the region, are often considered root causes of the continued recruitment of pirates. As oil theft can be quite lucrative, they are tempted in by the financial opportunities, as well as social belonging as we often see with gangs.
However, the root cause of the regional maritime insecurity is related to the government. Bad governance is a result of unreliable legal frameworks, poor law enforcement, and widespread corruption. The oil industry is intertwined with the state structures and the politicians, and the regimes are often completely dependent on the industry to survive. Especially in Nigeria, we see this dependence on a federal, state, and local level, and to different extents in every other country in the region. State and government directly or indirectly bear responsibility for the piracy problem, by colluding with the criminal networks. The mafia-like structures in the criminal networks enable the leaders to be closely connected to the government. They have individuals in governments who help the criminals strategize, realize, and even sponsor the pirate attacks. The authorities are often aware of these networks for years without doing anything.
What is being done with piracy in the region?
Regional Cooperation. The Gulf of Guinea’s maritime insecurity has caught the international community’s attention and showed there is a need for a collective response. The weak national institutions, corruption at every level of government, a lack of cooperation and the until recently absence of any regional institutions responsible for peace and security. Much of the maritime crimes appear in coastal states territorial waters, which means that external actors have a hard time intervening as their jurisdiction only covers international waters. With that context, regional cooperation with international support seems to be the best possible solution. However, this cooperation isn’t necessarily simple, as many regional states in the Gulf of Guinea have a distrust of Nigeria. While the Economic Community of Central Africa States has made some progress in the aspect of cooperation, pooling of resources and institutional development, the Economic Community of West African States have not made the same progress. ECCAS’s strategic objectives include information sharing, surveillance of maritime space, cooperation of actions at sea, a regional maritime tax, acquisition of equipment and the creation of a maritime conference.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), on the other hand, is far behind its sister organization. After pirate attacks spread to Benin, the region realized that maritime security was not only a problem in Nigeria but the whole Western Africa gulf region, both coastal and landlocked. ECOWAS is actively trying to replicate the ECCAS model around cooperation on maritime governance, however, it is held back by West African leaders who are unwilling to give up sovereign rights and the ability to govern their territory. Weaker states are particularly wary of stronger neighbours, especially that of Nigeria, the regional hegemon, believing it would take advantage if they conceded sovereignty to further its regional interests. Furthermore, maritime cooperation continues to be difficult for Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire because of a maritime border dispute. Some countries find it difficult to cooperate based on differences from being colonized by Great Britain and France, by having different working languages, bureaucracies and cultures that hinder communication and trust. The ECOWAS Commission has very little authority to force through changes in maritime policy and practices, it has only set up guidelines and principles that aren’t enforced.
The Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) was established in 1999 to harmonize the policies of the regional member states on topics of peace and security, management of fossil fuels, and transportation of people and goods. However, the commission struggles to be more than a piece of paper or a concept. The creation of the commission has been held back by disputes between Cameroon and Nigeria, and political tensions have blocked any chance of institutional development. Distrust of Nigeria using the commission to resolve border conflicts in its favour, and a general regional fear of Nigerian and Angolan hegemony, makes progress hard. Nigeria would like to play leader in the Gulf of Guinea; however, such ambitions are unlikely for other states in the region to accept. Moreover, Nigeria’s proximity to both the ECCAS and ECOWAS countries has made cooperation between these two organizations necessary, specifically concerning crimes committed in ECCAS countries and the criminal finding refuge in Nigerian waters. However, even with the regional distrust of Nigeria, a solution depends on the cooperation between ECCAS, ECOWAS and the GGC to make any progress in fighting piracy. The advantage of such an arrangement would be to counterbalance hegemonic powers by imposing community rules and realizing cooperation between all states relevant to the pursuit of regional piracy and maritime crime. However, as of now discussion between ECCAS and ECOWAS has not resulted in an agreement of a legal and operational framework for cooperation.
International Cooperation. International maritime security cooperation has gained traction in the Gulf of Guinea, with the United States at the forefront in this regard. It launched the Africa Partnership Station with the deployment of military ships and a consistent presence in the region, as well as cooperation through joint exercises and engagement through US Africa Command. Furthermore, the European Union launched the Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea project designed to improve security and safety off the coasts of many regional states. Other states like China have increasingly become present in the region as well, undertaking joint drills with Cameroon in 2014. At the multilateral level, we see that the International Maritime Organization and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime have maritime security programs in the Gulf, as well as an INTERPOL initiative, focused on investigating maritime-security crimes.
Support often comes in the form of capacity building of the naval forces, like training, equipment, and boats to boost the maritime capacity and more rapidly respond to attacks. Nigeria refused to host the US Africa Command; however, US forces regularly train the Nigerian navy. The United States has continuingly improved Nigeria’s Maritime Awareness Capability by setting up radars, radio equipment and identification systems along the shore. It has also donated boats and supports maritime security exercises.
Moreover, France supports formal colonies through advising the military leaders, drawing up maritime security strategies, training civilian and military capabilities and improving coordination between various countries in the region. Called ASECMAR, this project sought to strengthen sovereignty in key regional countries like Nigeria by improving maritime capacities and internal political security.
Additionally, the UK supports former colonies bilaterally but also backs an association of oil companies that ship fossil fuels, with a goal of information sharing between companies relating to security incidents in the Gulf of Guinea. All three mentioned states have also tried to encourage as much cooperation between the Gulf of Guinea states as possible, through multinational military exercises and training local navies to deter piracy and help ships being attacked.
The United Nations have also noticed the situation in the Gulf of Guinea. Discussion in the Security Council and a UN report of the situation and an assessment of UN involvement has helped draw attention to the problem. The UN intends to provide technical support to coastal ports and shipping companies through the UNODC offices. It also plans to organize a summit with all the Gulf states involved to agree on a comprehensive strategy to counteract the growing piracy and maritime insecurity. The EU has commissioned studies on the Gulf of Guinea region and aims to curb drug trafficking from Latin America to Europe via the ports in the region by strengthening the maritime control.
However, support from multiple international actors makes it harder for local and national ownership of strategies to increase maritime security, most of all in smaller countries with less maritime experience. While building up the maritime capabilities of smaller and poorer states is an important part of the counter-piracy measures, an overemphasis on this by Western powers creates a narrow understanding of the security problems of the region. Piracy is purely a security issue, as I have discussed earlier. It is also a form of organized crime and a symptom of deeper government problems onshore with corruption, mismanagement, economic inequality and social issues.
The Way Forward
Combating piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is no easy task. It requires more effective measures across all aspects of the problem. Improving security is more about the strategic management of maritime space than it is about naval fleets and patrols. The central and west African states must agree on clear transit corridors and anchorage points and must patrol and keep the transport vessels safe. This is quite like the corridor that functioned well in the Gulf of Aden, however, in this region, it requires a lot more regional and national collaboration between the states. The establishment of a regional operational centre could resolve some issues with cooperation.
The region’s states consider the fight against piracy and priority, as this has become a serious issue for every state in the region, however, this does require addressing the root cause of the issue. Long-term policies are incredibly important to improve economic and political governance and stability, especially in the maritime industries, maritime law enforcement and coastal economies. Most of the efforts must be focused on Nigeria and the Niger Delta, as it is the epicentre of maritime violence, corruption, crime, and poverty that create a fertile ground for piracy.
Moreover, other countries in the region have also exacerbated the problem by neglecting or ignoring their maritime domains, and they need to take responsibility for everything that happens within their exclusive economic zones. Government leaders should launch a strategic, multi-sector and extensive response to the root cause and manifestation of maritime crime in their countries. A maritime affairs office should be set up to develop maritime security strategies and should include all the relevant agencies in their agenda to coordinate at the policy and operational levels. Piracy should not only be recognized as a security problem but also as a transnational organized crime problem. Governments must work closely with the private sector to mitigate risk to the maritime traffic and prosecute maritime crime effectively. Close bilateral, regional, inter-regional and international is demanded as this is of a transnational criminal nature. So, this means more cooperation inside the ECOWAS and ECCAS bubble, however also between these two organizations. The Gulf of Guinea states should also actively seek support from international powers like the US, UK and France and international organizations like the UN to create regional maritime security strategies.
Long-term Reforms
Long-term there is a need for large reforms. The failures of the regional community have encouraged and created opportunities for pirates, and to address the root causes requires long-term policies, namely: economic governance, development, and maritime law enforcement. Poor economic governance of the fossil fuels industry has created a black oil market and enabled the elites to grow rich and corrupt, while the majority remains poor. A core security issue should be for states to eliminate opportunities for corruption and help those in need, and generally reform the oil industries.
Furthermore, all coastal states need to take steps to improve the living standards for their people along the shore. Investing in services that facilitate economic growth and job opportunities such as roads, electricity, water, health, and education, making the coastal and maritime domains safer and decreasing the need for people to turn to crime. The potential of this sector remains largely untapped. The governments should also ensure safety and access for commercial fishing and prevent foreign commercial fishers from encroaching on their maritime territory. Coastal states should work more closely with international fossil fuel companies to share the responsibility of job creation, infrastructure projects and social welfare, especially in the Niger Delta region.
Lastly, maritime law enforcement needs to be strengthened and professionalized through the organs of naval forces, port authorities and maritime administration agencies. This means transparent recruitment, training and buying up-to-date equipment and technology maritime tools. Corruption cannot be tolerated inside these organs. All coastal states need to develop extensive maritime awareness by monitoring their EEZs and preventing illegal activities and developing surveillance systems. This awareness should work closely with the before-mentioned national organs to paint a full picture of the maritime activities in the states’ EEZs. All these systems set in place should manage to tackle trafficking in oil, weapons, drugs, and people.
Bibliography
Osinowo, A. A. (2015). Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19053
International Crisis Group. (2012). INTRODUCTION. In THE GULF OF GUINEA: THE NEW DANGER ZONE (p. Page 1-Page 1). International Crisis Group. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep32205.4
Kamal-Deen, A. (2015). THE ANATOMY OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY. Naval War College Review, 68(1), 93–118. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26397818
Barrios, C. (2013). Fighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: Offshore and onshore. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06835
Smith-Windsor, B. A., & Pavia, J. F. (2014). From the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Guinea: A New Maritime Mission for NATO? NATO Defense College. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10368
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